Coordination and weak announcement proofness: Two comments on ''refining cheap-talk equilibria''
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Conlon, JR
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2200
发表日期：
1997
页码：
220-224
关键词：
摘要：
This paper considers the ''weak announcement proofness'' criterion of Matthews et al. (J. Econ. Theory (1991)) and shows that this criterion is not always weaker than announcement proofness. It is also shown that, in the class of simple sender-receiver games considered by Matthews et al., if one equilibrium Pareto dominates all of the others. then weak announcement proofness usually selects that equilibrium. (C) 1997 Academic Press.