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作者：Dekel, E; Scotchmer, S
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：A long-standing conjecture is that winner-take-all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk-takers and the extinction of risk-averters. In many species a winner-lake-ail game determines the males' right to reproduce, and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to he risk-takers. Psychological and sociological evidence buttresses the argument that males are more risk-taking than females. Using an evolutionary model of preference-formation, we investigate to what extent ...
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作者：Wälde, K
作者单位：Dortmund University of Technology; The World Bank
摘要：This paper studies optimal saving and investment behaviour of a household that can either invest in a riskless or a risky saving technology when risk results from a Poisson process. The focus is on behaviour of households in a general equilibrium setup. Poisson processes are introduced since they allow us to understand and model endogenous cycles jointly with long-run growth. It turns out that a very simple, intuitive and tractable characterization of equilibrium is possible. Journal of Econom...
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作者：Bandyopadhyay, T; Sengupta, K
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
摘要：This paper examines the connection between path independence and transitive rationalization of a choice function in a general domain where a choice function may nor include all possible non-empty subsets of the universal set. Describing a sequential choice procedure, this paper show's that the requirement of path independence of a choice function is equivalent to Richter's Congruence Axiom and thus to its transitive rationalization. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D11. (C...
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作者：Hillier, B; Rougier, J
作者单位：University of Liverpool; Durham University
摘要：This paper develops a simple neo-classical model of the business cycle characterised by multiple equilibria produced by the interaction of the investment and production processes. For the usual symmetric information model the source of the multiple equilibria may be found in non-linearities in the production function. Under asymmetric information another possible source of multiple equilibria is non-linearities in the investment-wealth relationship. Persistence is generated by changes in the s...
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作者：Gretsky, NE; Ostroy, JM; Zame, WR
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper provides a rigorous formalization, in the context of the transferable utility assignment model, of perfect competition as the inability of individuals to (favorably) influence prices. The central tool for the analysis is the social gains function; the central issue is differentiability of the gains function with respect to the population. Seven conditions are shown to be equivalent to perfect competition. Perfect competition and imperfect competition are possible for both finite and...
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作者：Bandyopadhyay, T; Dasgupta, I; Pattanaik, PK
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; Deakin University
摘要：This paper extends the deterministic revealed preference theory of consumers' behavior to permit stochastic choices. In this extended framework, we introduce a restriction on stochastic choices that constitutes a stochastic counterpart of the weak axiom of revealed preference. This restriction allows us to derive stochastic versions of nonpositivity of the own substitution effect and the demand theorem. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Number Number: D11. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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作者：Spagnolo, G
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; University of Cambridge
摘要：Following Bernheim and Whinston (1990), this paper addresses the effects of multimarket contact on firms' ability to collude. Real world imperfections tend to make firms' objective function strictly concave and market supergames interdependent: firms' payoffs in each market depend on how they are doing in others. Then, multimarket contact always facilitates collusion. It may even make collusion sustainable in all markets when otherwise it would not be sustainable in any. The effects of conglom...
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作者：Strausz, R
作者单位：Free University of Berlin
摘要：We consider sequential partnerships in which agents obtain non-verifiable information about the actions taken by previous agents. For such partnerships a budget-balanced sharing rule exists that induces efficient production. The sharing rule has many desirable features: (1) it uniquely implements efficient production, (2) it does not rely on message games, (3) it does not rely on unlimited liability, and (4) it is robust to renegotiation. The rule is furthermore simple; intuitive; and robust t...
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作者：Blackorby, C; Bossert, W; Donaldson, D
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Aix-Marseille Universite; University of Nottingham; University of British Columbia
摘要：This note investigates the extension of Roberts' price-independent welfare prescriptions to alternatives in which population size and composition can vary. We show that ethically unsatisfactory orderings result. Suppose that a single person is to be added to a population that is unaffected in utility terms. Either all such additions must be regarded as bad or some expansions in which the added person's life is not worth living must be ranked as social improvements. Journal of Economic Literatu...
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作者：Chen, MA; Maskin, ES
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：The automatic bargaining theory of J. Nash (1950. Econometrica 18. 155-162) presumes that only status quo utilities and the shape of the utility possibilities set are relevant to the bargaining outcome. Here we consider a class of economic problems for which bargaining solutions may depend on more than just utility information. (A fifty-fifty split of a single good between two bargainers is one example of such a solution.) It is shown that the requirements of Pareto efficiency), weak symmetry,...
