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作者：Chwe, MSY
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：I present in Simple two-person auction model in which a seller and a buyer make bids in terms of money; however: the value of a unit of money is uncertain. I show: (1) a monetary revaluation has purely nominal effects if and only if it is common knowledge: (2) if seller and buyer have identical beliefs, making the value of money common knowledge maximizes total gains from trade; (3) if seller and buyer are equally well informed and have identical beliefs, then monetary revaluations have no net...
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作者：Schroder, M; Skiadas, C
作者单位：Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business; Northwestern University
摘要：We develop the utility gradient (or martingale) approach for computing portfolio and consumption plans that maximize stochastic differential utility (SDU), a continuous-time version of recursive utility due to D. Duffie and L. Epstein (1992, Econometrica 60. 353-394). We characterize the first-order conditions of optimality as a system of forward-backward SDEs, which, in the Markovian case, reduces to a system of PDEs and forward only SDEs that is amenable to numerical computation, Another con...
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作者：Bag, PK; Winter, E
作者单位：University of London; Birkbeck University London; Washington University (WUSTL); Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：For excludable public goods, we propose simple mechanisms to implement a (core) stable and efficient production and cost-sharing outcome: consumers are asked to announce sequentially their minimal requested level of public good and a subscription towards its production. In one mechanism the subscriptions depend on the order of moves. In a second mechanism, the subscriptions are order-independent and thus symmetric. The equilibrium outcomes induced by our mechanisms are immune to strategic devi...
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作者：Cozzi, G
作者单位：Cornell University; Sapienza University Rome
摘要：If R&D produces nonrival inputs then firms have an incentive to cooperate, but free riding can make cooperation difficult. This paper builds a simple endogenous growth model allowing cooperative behavior among firms in their R&D game. growth Industry's first best cooperative investment is enforceable as an equilibrium only if technology is above a threshold level. This model allows for switching equilibria able to sustain slower growth in poorer countries. The model also admits sunspot equilib...
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作者：Gale, D; Rosenthal, RW
作者单位：New York University; Boston University
摘要：Do boundedly rational agents repeatedly playing a symmetric game with a unique symmetric equilibrium learn over time to play it? In this paper we model the dynamic interaction of two types of such agents, experimenters and imitators, whose behavior is characterized by simple rules of thumb. We iind that the stochastic process describing their play is stable in the large: it converges globally and with probability one to st compact neighborhood of the equilibrium. However, its local behavior ne...
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作者：Boucekkine, R; del Río, F; Licandro, O
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：In this paper, we present a particular case of the creative destruction model of Caballero and Hammour, (Quart. J. Econ. 111 (1996), 805-851) in which both exogenous and endogenous fluctuation sources are present. We show that job creation Follows a delayed differential equation with periodic coefficients. The delay is equal to the optimal age of capital goods. The period of the coefficients is equal to the period of an exogenous profitability cycle. We mathematically show that job creation is...
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作者：Mandler, M
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Pareto improvements that require no information about individual characteristics are analyzed. Initially, equilibrium must be production inefficient. After the policy change, consumer prices differ From producer prices, but allocations, although second-best, are Pareto superior and production efficient. Policy implementation is modeled as a dynamical system that governs aggregate consumer wealth, producer prices, and production levels. With knowledge of the maximum feasible level of consumer w...
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作者：Moulin, H
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：A commodity is divided among agents with single-peaked preferences. The commodity is either infinitely divisible or comes in indivisible units. A rationing method elicits individual peaks (demands); if the commodity is overdemanded (resp. underdemanded), no agent receives more (resp. less) than his peak. A fixed-path rationing method allocates an overdemanded good along a path independent of individual demands, except that an agent receives exactly his demand if it is below the path-generated ...
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作者：Epstein, LG; Peters, M
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Rochester
摘要：In modelling competition among mechanism designers, it is necessary to specify the set of feasible mechanisms. These specifications are often borrowed from the optimal mechanism design literature and exclude mechanisms that are natural in a competitive environment, for example, mechanisms that depend on the mechanisms chosen by competitors. This paper constructs a set of mechanisms that is universal in that any specific model of the feasible set can be embedded in it. An equilibrium for a spec...
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作者：Chattopadhyay, S; Gottardi, P
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Yale University
摘要：For a general class of pure exchange OLG economies under uncertainty, we provide a complete characterization of the efficiency properties of competitive equilibria when markers are only sequentially complete and the criterion of efficiency is conditional Pareto optimality. We also consider a particular case in which markets fail to be even sequentially complete and provide a characterization when the criterion of efficiency is weakened to ex post Pareto optimality. Journal of Economic Literatu...
