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作者：Schönhofer, M
作者单位：University of Bielefeld
摘要：Chaotic temporary equilibrium trajectories under least squares learning are shown to exist in a standard version of the overlapping generations model. Theses trajectories show forecast errors that never vanish. Thus we do not find convergence to an equilibrium, in which agents have perfect foresight. Complex trajectories can even be found in the case of savings functions, which are monotonically decreasing in the expected gross rate of inflation. In this case no cyclical or chaotic trajectorie...
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作者：Brusco, S; Jackson, MO
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study the optimal design of the rules of trade in a two-period market given that agents arrive at different times and may only trade with agents present contemporaneously. First period agents face a fixed cost of trading across periods. Given the non-convexities associated with the fixed cost, competitive trading rules can result in inefficiencies in such a market and anonymity must be sacrificed to achieve efficiency. Efficient trading rules have a market maker (who is given a monopoly rig...
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作者：Bergin, J; Duggan, J
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：The goal of non-cooperative foundations is to provide credible non-cooperative models of negotiation and coalition formation whose equilibrium outcomes agree with a given cooperative solution. Here we argue that this goal is best achieved by explicitly modeling the physical environment and individual preferences, and by constructing game forms independent of preferences to implement the cooperative solution. We propose a general model of the physical environment; we characterize the coalitiona...
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作者：Barucci, E; Bischi, GI; Gardini, L
作者单位：University of Pisa; University of Urbino
摘要：We study forward-looking economic models assuming that agents take one step ahead expectations looking back k time periods. We show that the dynamics of the economy with such an expectation Function are characterized by the coexistence of perfect foresight and nonperfect foresight cycles. The stability of all these periodic solutions under bounded rationality is related to the stability of the perfect foresight cycles. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, D83, D84; E31, ...
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作者：Yilankaya, O
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：It is shown with an example that, in bilateral trade problems with two-sided incomplete information. some seller types may obtain higher expected payoffs in mechanisms other than the one where they make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, contrary to popular belief. It. one looks at the mechanism selection problem of the (informed) seller, then the optimality of a take-it-or-leave-it offer for the seller is restored. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D82. (C) 1999 Acade...
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作者：Duggan, J
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：A general theorem on extending binary relations to linear (or strict linear) orders is proved. The well-known result that every partial order can be written as the intersection of linear orders in which it is embedded is obtained as a special case, as are several other extension theorems of this type. Using duality arguments, a number of results on the composition of binary relations are proved. For example, a complete, negatively transitive relation is the union of all linear orders embedded ...
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作者：Askenazy, P; Le Van, C
摘要：In this paper we present an optimal growth model with convex-concave technology for an open developing country. The latter may choose to produce consumption goods by borrowing on capital markets or to import consumption goods by investing its saving on capital markets. We prove there exist two nontrivial steady states. An optimal path converges either to 0 or to the high steady state, that depends on the levels of the initial debt and/or of the debt constraint. We also prove there exists a pov...
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作者：Stamland, T
作者单位：University of Wyoming
摘要：This paper shows that a signaling game has separating equilibria if and only if a monotonicity condition holds. This condition requires that, once the sender's types have been ordered according to the single-crossing condition, higher types elicit higher valuations. When this condition fails there may be many D1 outcomes, and the D1 criterion no longer guarantees Pareto dominance. For signaling games that violate this monotonicity condition, we select an equilibrium that conveys as much inform...
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作者：Rabault, G
摘要：This paper proposes a framework for the decomposition of risk into an aggregate and an idiosyncratic component which sidesteps the difficulties inherent in continuums of random variables, addressed recently in Al Najjar (Econometrica 63 (1995), 1195-1224). It assumes that the population is denumerable and that individuals are indistinguishable ex ante. In that context, a factorization of risk exists. A a-field of aggregate events can be identified, which is such that all aggregate quantities a...
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作者：Cadenillas, A; Zapatero, F
作者单位：University of Alberta; University of Southern California
摘要：We consider a currency with exchange rate dynamics modeled as a geometric Brownian motion. The objective of the Central Bank is to keep this exchange rate as close as possible to a given target, so there is a running cost associated to the difference between the exchange rate and the target. Additionally, there are also fixed and proportional costs associated with each intervention. The objective of this paper is to iind the optimal level of intervention, and the optimal sizes of the intervent...
