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作者：Armstrong, KG
作者单位：Carleton University
摘要：This paper establishes a basis in economic theory for solving the problem of how to make comparisons of aggregate quantities and price levels across two or more geographic regions, Two new classes of relative purchasing power measures are set out and the dual relationship between them are explored. The first is a many household analogue of the (single-household) cost-of-living index and, as such, is rooted in the theory of group cost-of-living indexes. The second is motivated by a generalizati...
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作者：Yoon, K
作者单位：Sogang University
摘要：We modify W. Vickrey's ( 196 1, J. Finance 16, 8-37) mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism. We provide sufficient conditions under which the modified Vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency. In addition, we prove that the modified Vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full efficiency cannot be achieved. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
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作者：Pérez-Castrillo, D; Wettstein, D
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero-monotonic environments with transferable utility. The mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the Shapley value payoffs, We extend our results to implement the weighted Shapley values. Finally, we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility...
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作者：Ely, JC; Yilankaya, O
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of British Columbia
摘要：A population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game G. The payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes. Each individual has preferences over the outcomes or the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to, those preferences. However, these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs. When evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take, the distribution of aggregate play must be a Nash e...
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作者：Barberà, S; Dutta, B; Sen, A
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We study the possibilities of constructing strategy-proor rules that choose sets or alternatives as a function or agents' preferences over such sets. We consider two restrictions on the domain of individual preferences over sets. Assuming that all singletons are in the range of the rule, we show that only dictatorial rules can be strategy-proof on the larger domain. The smaller domain also allows for rules,which select the set of best elements of two fixed agents. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
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作者：Suzumura, K; Xu, YS
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; University of Nottingham; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要：By allowing for the possibility that individuals recognize the intrinsic value of choice along with the instrumental value thereof, we suppose that individuals express extended preference orderings of the following type: Choosing an alternative x from an opportunity set A is better than choosing an alternative y from an opportunity set B. Within this framework, we identify a consequentialist and a nonconsequentialist, who show contrasting attiduces toward alternatives vis-a-vis opportunities, ...
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作者：Ok, EA; Vega-Redondo, F
作者单位：New York University; Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：We study the evolution of preferences via payoff monotonic dynamics in strategic environments with and without complete information. It is known that, with complete information and subgroup matching, empirically plausible interdependent preference relations may entail the local instability of individualistic preferences (which target directly the maximization of material payoffs,fitness). In contrast, under incomplete information (unobservability of preference types). M e show that independent...
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作者：Lau, SHP
作者单位：Australian National University; Hong Kong Baptist University
摘要：This paper provides an explanation for an important institutional feature of staggered time-dependent adjustment rules assumed in a number of macroeconomic models. It identifies strategic complementarity as the crucial factor leading to non-synchronized decisions in a game-theoretic framework. The paper first shows that nonsynchronization is the equilibrium outcome in an infinite-horizon game in which strategic complementarity is present. whether the players choose predetermined or fixed actio...
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作者：Curry, PA
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：This paper finds support for the evolution of interdependent preferences under natural selection from a (perhaps) surprising source: decision making under uncertainty. Individuals choose from sets of risky alternatives. The lotteries may involve either idiosyncratic risk or aggregate uncertainty or both. Robson (J. Econ. Theory 68 (1996), 397-324) gives the evaluation criterion for lotteries that maximizes reproductive value and shows that it does not satisfy the expected utility theorem. Coop...
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作者：[Anonymous]
