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作者：Bloise, G
摘要：In this paper, we propose a geometric method for the analysis of first-order sunspot equilibra in a class of nonlinear dynamic economic models without predetermined variables. We show that such stochastic equilibria exist around a steady state whenever it is locally indeterminate. Moreover, under some assumptions, we prove the existence of sunspot equilibria persisting on a full dimensioned support close to the steady state even when local indeterminacy is only lower dimensional, (C) 2001 Acad...
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作者：Bisin, A; Verdier, T
作者单位：New York University; Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS)
摘要：This paper studies the population dynamics of preference traits in a model of intergenerational cultural transmission. Parents socialize and transmit their preferences to their offspring, motivated by a form of paternalistic altruism (imperfect empathy). In such a setting we study the long run stationary state pattern of preferences in the population. according to carious socialization mechanisms and institutions. and identify sufficient conditions for the global stability of an heterogenous s...
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作者：Calvet, LE
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This paper shows that the precautionary motive, combined with asset incompleteness, is a major source of volatility and indeterminacy in financial markets. Price fluctuations originate from agents' efforts to insure themselves through time by borrowing and lending instead of shifting income across states or nature by trading risky assets. A high interest rate at a future date reduces the potential for future consumption smoothing via borrowing. which leads to a strong precautionary motive and ...
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作者：Shi, SY
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Queens University - Canada
摘要：This paper examines the two-sided matching problem where the agents on each side of the market are heterogeneous and the matching process: is lime consuming. This is cast in a labor market setting where workers of different skills match with different machine qualities. I characterize the efficient allocation and then show that it call be decentralized by a market mechanism. The efficient assignment is not always positively assortative. despite the fact that machine qualities and skills are co...
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作者：Sprumont, Y
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We characterize the regular two-agent Paretian quasi-orders. (C) 2001 Academic Press .
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作者：Cole, HL; Mailath, GJ; Postlewaite, A
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Do investors making complementary investments face the correct incentives, especially when they cannot contract with each other prior to their decisions'? We present a two-sided matching model in which buyers and sellers make investments prior to matching. Once matched, buyer and seller bargain over the price, taking into account outside options. Efficient decisions can always be sustained in equilibrium. We characterize the inefficiencies that can arise in equilibrium and show that equilibria...
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作者：Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
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作者：Sethi, R; Somanathan, E
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This paper provides an evolutionary theory of reciprocity as an aspect of preference interdependence. It is shown that reciprocal preferences, which place negative weight on the payoffs of materialists and positive weight on the payoffs of sufficiently altruistic individuals can invade a population of materialists in a class of aggregative games under both assortative and nonassortative matching. In comparison with simpler specifications of preference interdependence (such aa pure altruism or ...
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作者：Moscarini, G; Ottaviani, M
作者单位：Yale University; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper investigates price competition with private information on the demand side. Two sellers each offer a different variety of a good to a buyer endowed with a private binary signal on their relative quality. The model provides an informational foundation to differentiation in Hotelling's price competition game. Equilibrium comparative statics is performed with respect to the prior belief and the precision of the private information. Competition is fierce when the prior strongly favors o...
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作者：Matsuyama, K
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper extends the analysis or K. Matsuyama (Econometrica 67 (1999), 335-347) to the case of an infinitely lived representative agent economy, The economy grows endogenously through endogenous fluctuations, perpetually moving back and forth between two phases. In one phase, there is no innovation, the market structure is competitive, and the economy grows solely by capital accumulation. In the other phase, new goods are introduced and the market structure is monopolistic. In the long run, ...
