Strategy-proof social choice correspondences
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Barberà, S; Dutta, B; Sen, A
署名单位：
Autonomous University of Barcelona; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2000.2782
发表日期：
2001
页码：
374-394
关键词：
摘要：
We study the possibilities of constructing strategy-proor rules that choose sets or alternatives as a function or agents' preferences over such sets. We consider two restrictions on the domain of individual preferences over sets. Assuming that all singletons are in the range of the rule, we show that only dictatorial rules can be strategy-proof on the larger domain. The smaller domain also allows for rules,which select the set of best elements of two fixed agents. (C) 2001 Academic Press.