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作者：Conley, JP; Wooders, MH
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Warwick
摘要：We consider a Tiebout economy with differential crowding and public projects in which agents are distinguished by their tastes and genetic endowments. Agents choose which crowding characteristic, for example, a skill, they with to express, and this affects their value to other members of their jurisdiction, club, firm. etc. An agent's choice is influenced both by his genetic endowment. which affects his cost of acquiring crowding characteristics. and by his preferences over which crowding char...
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作者：Weder, M
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：This paper presents a small open economy version of the J. Benhabib and R. E. A. Farmer (1996, J. Monet. Econ. 37, 421-443) two sector optimal growth model with production externalities. It is shown that indeterminacy is considerably easier to obtain under a regime of perfect world capital markets than in the closed economy variant. Furthermore. the result is not dependent on a high labor supply elasticity since that input is fixed. The paper also examines a variant which takes into account ex...
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作者：Miyagawa, E
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：We consider the Shapley-Scarf house allocation problem where monetary transfers are allowed. We characterize the class of mechanisms that are strategy-proof ex post individually rational, ex. post budget-balanced, and collusion-proof In these mechanisms, the price of each object is fixed in advance, and the objects are reallocated according to the (unique) core assignment of the Shapley-Scarf economy associated with the prices. The special case in which all prices are zero is the core mechanis...
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作者：Corchón, LC; Iturbe-Ormaetxe, I
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：So far, the theory of distributive justice has tried to single out a unique criterion of justice, different people hold conflicting ideas about justice. We propose a procedure for representing these individual opinions by means of aspiration functions. We present three different ways of aggregating such opposing opinions into a socially acceptable judgement. Furthermore, we show that many well-known concepts are special cases of our approach. We study, under a restriction on the form of the as...
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作者：Anderlini, L; Canning, D
作者单位：University of Southampton; Georgetown University; Queens University Belfast
摘要：The introduction of a small amount of bounded rationality into a model sometimes has little effect and sometimes has a dramatic impact on predicted behavior. We call a model robust to bounded rationality if small deviations from rationality result only in small changes in the equilibrium set. We also say that a model is structurally stable if the equilibrium set (given fully rational agents) varies continuously with the parameter values of the model. It is easy to see that when the equilibrium...
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作者：Bogomolnaia, A; Moulin, H
作者单位：Southern Methodist University
摘要：A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to individual preferences over sure objects. Ordinal efficiency implies (is implied by) ex post (ex ante) efficiency. A simple algorithm characterizes ordinally efficient assignments: our solution, probabilistic serial (PS), is a central element within their set. Random priority (RP) orders agents from the uniform distribution, then lets them choose successively their best remaining object. RP is ex p...
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作者：Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This payer studies decision makers characterized by a stock of models, or analogies, who respond to strategic interactions by applying what appear to be the most suitable models: balancing the gains from more sophisticated decisionmaking against the cost of placing heavier demands on scarce reasoning resources. Equilibrium models will be finely tuned to interactions, leading to seemingly rational behavior, when the interactions are sufficiently important and sufficiently distinct that a more g...
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作者：Dávila, J
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper shows the general reversibility of every perfect foresight equilibrium of an overlapping generations economy. It then shows and characterizes the existence of reversible sunspot equilibria in these economics as well, which seems to be at odds with our intuition about the irreversibility of a tree of events. Although the paper establishes also that such reversible Stochastic equilibria constitute a negligible subset of all the equilibria of their class, their mere existence may be co...
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作者：Epstein, LG; Marinacci, M
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Turin
摘要：For suitable non-atomic TU games v, the core can be determined by computing appropriate derivatives of v, yielding one of two stark conclusions: either core(v) is empty or it consists of a single measure that can be expressed explicitly in terms of derivatives of v. In this sense, core theory for a class of games may be reduced to calculus. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
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作者：Krasa, S; Shafer, W
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：Consider an exchange economy with complete information. We perturb this economy by assuming that cacti agent's observation about the true state of the world is noisy. The paper investigates the robustness of equilibria of the complete information economy with respect to incomplete information. We provide conditions under which complete information equilibria are limits of equilibria of the economics with incomplete information, as the noise in the signal converges to zero. (C) 2001 Academic Pr...
