On the evolution of individualistic preferences: An incomplete information scenario

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ok, EA; Vega-Redondo, F
• 署名单位: New York University; Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2668
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 231-254
• 关键词: evolution; preferences; individualistic; incomplete information

摘要

We study the evolution of preferences via payoff monotonic dynamics in strategic environments with and without complete information. It is known that, with complete information and subgroup matching, empirically plausible interdependent preference relations may entail the local instability of individualistic preferences (which target directly the maximization of material payoffs,fitness). In contrast, under incomplete information (unobservability of preference types). M e show that independent preferences are globally stable in a large set of environments and locally stable in essentially any standard environment, provided that the number of subgroups that form in the society is large. Since these results are obtained within the context of a very general model. they may be thought of as providing an evolutionary rationals for the prevalence of individualistic preferences. (C) 2001 Academic Press.