Informational robustness of competitive equilibria
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Krasa, S; Shafer, W
署名单位：
University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2000.2771
发表日期：
2001
页码：
494-518
关键词：
摘要：
Consider an exchange economy with complete information. We perturb this economy by assuming that cacti agent's observation about the true state of the world is noisy. The paper investigates the robustness of equilibria of the complete information economy with respect to incomplete information. We provide conditions under which complete information equilibria are limits of equilibria of the economics with incomplete information, as the noise in the signal converges to zero. (C) 2001 Academic Press.