Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Conley, JP; Wooders, MH
署名单位：
University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Warwick
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2000.2716
发表日期：
2001
页码：
261-294
关键词：
摘要：
We consider a Tiebout economy with differential crowding and public projects in which agents are distinguished by their tastes and genetic endowments. Agents choose which crowding characteristic, for example, a skill, they with to express, and this affects their value to other members of their jurisdiction, club, firm. etc. An agent's choice is influenced both by his genetic endowment. which affects his cost of acquiring crowding characteristics. and by his preferences over which crowding characteristic he expresses. We show that if small groups are strictly effective, the core is equivalent to the set of anonymous competitive equilibrium outcomes, but that the core generally contains taste-homogeneous jurisdictions. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
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