Analogies, adaptation, and anomalies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Samuelson, L
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2754
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 320-366
• 关键词: analogies; bargaining; bounded rationality; complexity; EVOLUTION

摘要

This payer studies decision makers characterized by a stock of models, or analogies, who respond to strategic interactions by applying what appear to be the most suitable models: balancing the gains from more sophisticated decisionmaking against the cost of placing heavier demands on scarce reasoning resources. Equilibrium models will be finely tuned to interactions, leading to seemingly rational behavior, when the interactions are sufficiently important and sufficiently distinct that a more generic model entails a prohibitive payoff reduction. Interactions that are infrequently encountered. relatively unimportant. or similar to other interactions may trigger seemingly inappropriate analogies. leading to behavioral anomalies. (C) 2001 Academic Press.