The core of large differentiable TU games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Epstein, LG; Marinacci, M
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; University of Turin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2810
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 235-273
• 关键词: Core; transferable utility games; Large games; non-atomic games; market games; exchange economies; calculus; derivatives

摘要

For suitable non-atomic TU games v, the core can be determined by computing appropriate derivatives of v, yielding one of two stark conclusions: either core(v) is empty or it consists of a single measure that can be expressed explicitly in terms of derivatives of v. In this sense, core theory for a class of games may be reduced to calculus. (C) 2001 Academic Press.