A new solution to the random assignment problem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bogomolnaia, A; Moulin, H
• 署名单位: Southern Methodist University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2710
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 295-328
• 关键词: Random assignment; Ordinal; ex post or ex ante efficiency; strategyproofness; Envy-free

摘要

A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to individual preferences over sure objects. Ordinal efficiency implies (is implied by) ex post (ex ante) efficiency. A simple algorithm characterizes ordinally efficient assignments: our solution, probabilistic serial (PS), is a central element within their set. Random priority (RP) orders agents from the uniform distribution, then lets them choose successively their best remaining object. RP is ex post, but not always ordinally, efficient. PS is envy-free, RP is not; RP is strategy-proof, PS is not. Ordinal efficiency, Strategyproofness, and equal treatment of equals are incompatible. (C) 2001 Academic Press.