Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Frankel, DM; Morris, S; Pauzner, A
• 署名单位: Cornell University; Yale University; Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00018-2
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 1-44
• 关键词: Equilibrium selection; global games; strategic complementarities; supermodular games

摘要

We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme (Econometrica 61 (1993) 989-1018) for two-player, two-action games. The surviving profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient conditions on payoffs for there to be noise-independent selection. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.