Coalition formation as a dynamic process

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Konishi, H; Ray, D
• 署名单位: New York University; Boston College; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00004-8
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 1-41
• 关键词: Coalition formation; farsightedness; dynamic equilibrium

摘要

We study coalition formation as an ongoing, dynamic process, with payoffs generated as coalitions form, disintegrate, or regroup. A process of coalition formation (PCF) is an equilibrium if a coalitional move to some other state can be justified by the expectation of higher future value, compared to inaction. This future value, in turn, is endogenous: it depends on coalitional movements at each node. We study existence of equilibrium PCFs. We connect deterministic equilibrium PCFs with unique absorbing state to the core, and equilibrium PCFs with multiple absorbing states to the largest consistent set. In addition, we study cyclical as well as stochastic equilibrium PCFs. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.