Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aoyagi, M
• 署名单位: University of Osaka
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00071-1
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 79-105
• 关键词: Collusion; auction; repeated games

摘要

This paper studies bidder collusion with communication in repeated auctions when no side transfer is possible. It presents a simple dynamic bid rotation scheme which coordinates bids based on communication history and enables intertemporal transfer of bidders' payoffs. The paper derives a sufficient condition for such a dynamic scheme to be an equilibrium and characterizes the equilibrium payoffs in a general environment with affiliated signals and private or interdependent values. With IPV, it is shown that this dynamic scheme yields a strictly higher payoff to the bidders than any static collusion scheme which coordinates bids based only on the current reported signals. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.