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作者：Bester, H; Petrakis, E
作者单位：Free University of Berlin; University of Crete
摘要：We describe the evolution of productivity growth in a competitive industry with free entry and exit. The exogenous wage rate determines the firms' engagement in labor productivity enhancing process innovation. There is a unique steady state of the industry dynamics, which is globally asymptotically stable. In the steady state, the number of active firms, their unit labor cost and supply depend on the growth rate but not on the level of the wage rate. In addition to providing comparative static...
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作者：Ferreira, JL
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We study an oligopolistic industry where firms are able to sell in a futures market at infinitely many moments prior to the spot market. A kind of Folk-theorem is established: any outcome between perfect competition and Cournot can be sustained in equilibrium. We then find that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a renegotiation-proof equilibrium. However, this is not true for the competitive outcome. Furthermore, only the monopolistic outcome is renegotiation-proof if firms can buy and se...
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作者：Anderson, SP; Renault, R
作者单位：University of Virginia; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We derive bounds on the ratios of deadweight loss and consumer surplus to producer surplus under Cournot competition. To do so, we introduce a parameterization of the degree of curvature of market demand using the parallel concepts of rho-concavity and rho-convexity. The more concave is demand, the larger the share of producer surplus in overall surplus, the smaller is consumer surplus relative to producer surplus, and the lower the ratio of deadweight loss to producer surplus. Deadweight loss...
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作者：Detemple, JB; Karatzas, I
作者单位：Boston University; Columbia University; Columbia University
摘要：We formulate a model of preferences with non-addictive habits, where consumption is required to be non-negative at all times, but can fall below a standard of living index that aggregates past consumption. We study the consumption-portfolio problem taking account of the non-negativity constraint on consumption, and provide a constructive proof for the existence of an optimal policy on a finite time-horizon [0, T]. We show that the consumption constraint binds up to an endogenous stopping time ...
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作者：Matros, A
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：Saez-Marti and Weibull (J. Econom. Theory 86 (1999) 268) investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's (J. Econom. Theory 59 (1993) 145) bargaining model, which is how they introduce cleverness of players. I analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games and show Young's (Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1998) prediction to be robust: adaptive learning with clev...
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作者：Katzman, B; Kennan, J; Wallace, N
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Miami; National Bureau of Economic Research; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：Monetary uncertainty and information lags are put into a random matching model so that the resulting setting has some meetings in which producers are relatively informed and others in which consumers are relatively informed. For that setting, the ex ante socially optimal way to conduct trade is characterized. The optimum can display a variety of relationships between money and total output and the price level. While the price level is always sticky, even the direction of its response and that ...
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作者：Cason, TN; Friedman, D
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：We study markets with costly buyer search in which sellers simultaneously post prices. Buyers costlessly observe one or (with probability 1-q) two of the posted prices, and can accept one or pay to search again. The experiment varies q, the search cost, and the number of buyers. Equilibrium theory predicts a unified very low (high) price for q = 0 (q = 1) and predicts specific distributions of dispersed prices for q = 1/3 and 2/3. Actual prices conform closely to the predictions in some treatm...
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作者：Kalai, E; Solan, E
作者单位：Northwestern University; Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Randomization adds beneficial flexibility to the construction of optimal simple plans in dynamic environments. A decision-maker, restricted to the use of simple plans, may find a stochastic plan that strictly outperforms all deterministic ones. This is true even in noninteractive deterministic environments where the decision-maker's choices have no influence on his signals nor on the future evolution of the system. We describe a natural decomposition of simple plans into two components: an act...
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作者：Peck, J; Spear, SE
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Carnegie Mellon University
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作者：Green, EJ; Lin, P
作者单位：Lingnan University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：In a finite-trader version of the Diamond and Dybvig (J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983) 401) model, the ex ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism (i.e., each trader announces the type of his own ex post preference) in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader. When the model is modified by formalizing the sequential-service constraint (cf. Wallace (Fed. Reserve Bank Minneapolis Quart. Rev. 12 (1988) 3)), the truth-telling equilibrium implemen...
