-
作者：Page, FH; Wooders, MH; Kamat, S
作者单位：University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; University of Warwick; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We provide a new framework for the analysis of network formation and demonstrate the existence of farsightedly consistent directed networks. Our framework extends the standard notion of a network and also introduces the notion of a supernetwork. A supernetwork is made tip of a collection of directed networks (the nodes) and represents (via the arcs connecting the nodes) preferences and rules governing network formation. By extending Chwe's 1994 result oil the nonemptiness of farsightedly consi...
-
作者：Parreiras, SO
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：Cremer and McLean (Econometrica 56 (1988) 1247-1258) obtain a sufficient and necessary condition for full surplus extraction in Bayesian-Nash equilibrium - the rank condition. which McAfee and Reny (Econometrica 60(2) (1992) 395-421) later generalize for Continuous type spaces. This paper shows that, if the principal does not know how noisy is the agent's signal - or equivalently, when signals available to an agent can be ranked by Blackwell's informativeness and. an agent's informativeness is...
-
作者：Cripps, MW; Dekel, E; Pesendorfer, W
作者单位：Northwestern University; Washington University (WUSTL); Tel Aviv University; Princeton University
摘要：We analyze reputation effects in two-player repeated games of strictly conflicting interests. In such games, player 1 has a commitment action such that a best reply to it gives player 1 the highest individually rational payoff and player 2 the minmax payoff. Players have equal discount factors. With positive probability player 1 is a type who chooses the commitment action after every history. We show that player 1's payoff converges to the maximally feasible payoff when the discount factor con...
-
作者：Dutta, B; Ghosal, S; Ray, D
作者单位：University of Warwick; New York University
摘要：This paper studies a model of dynamic network formation when individuals are farsighted: players evaluate the desirability of a current move in terms of its consequences on the entire discounted stream of payoffs. We define a concept of equilibrium which takes into account farsighted behavior of agents and allows for limited cooperation amongst agents. We show that an equilibrium process of network formation exists. We also show that there are valuation structures in which no equilibrium strat...
-
作者：Rothschild, CG
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Kajii and Morris (J. Econ. Theory 82 (1998) 267) provide necessary and sufficient conditions for two priors to be strategically close. The restrictiveness of these conditions establishes that strategic behavior can be highly sensitive to the assumed prior. Their results thus recommend care in the use of priors in economic modelling. Unfortunately, their proof of a central proposition fails for zero probability types. This comment corrects their proof to account for these cases. (C) 2004 Elsevi...
-
作者：Jehiel, P; Samet, D
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：Game theoretic models of learning which are based on the strategic form of the game cannot explain learning in games with large extensive form. We study learning in such games by using valuation of moves. A valuation for a player is a numeric assessment of her moves that purports to reflect their desirability. We consider a myopic player, who chooses moves with the highest valuation. Each time the game is played, the player revises her valuation by assigning the payoff obtained in the play to ...
-
作者：Chakraborty, A; Citanna, A
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：We consider a model of occupational choice in large economies where individuals differ in their wealth endowment. Individuals can remain self-employed or engage in productive matches with another individual, i.e., form firms. Matches are subject to a moral hazard problem with limited liability. The division of the gains from such matches is determined by competitive forces. When the incentive problem is asymmetric, matches are typically wealth-heterogeneous, with richer individuals choosing th...
-
作者：Hansen, LP; Sargent, TJ
作者单位：New York University; University of Chicago
摘要：In a Markov decision problem with hidden state variables, a decision maker expresses fear that his model is misspecified by surrounding it with a set of alternatives that are nearby as measured by their expected log likelihood ratios (entropies). Sets of martingales represent alternative models. Within a two-player zero-sum game under commitment, a minimizing player chooses a martingale at time 0. Probability distributions that solve distorted filtering problems serve as state variables, much ...
-
作者：Roth, AE; Sönmez, T; Ünver, MU
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University; Boston College; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：The literature on exchange of indivisible goods finds natural application in the exchange of live donor kidneys for transplant. However, in kidney exchange, there are constraints on the size of exchanges. Initially, kidney exchanges are likely to be between just two patient-donor pairs. We show that, although this constraint eliminates some potential exchanges, there is a wide class of constrained-efficient mechanisms that are strategy-proof when patient-donor pairs and surgeons have 0-1 prefe...
-
作者：Maniquet, F; Sprumont, Y
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the properties that individual welfare levels below the stand-alone lower bound (respectively, above the unanimity upper bound) should be increased (respectively, reduced). Combining either property with efficiency and ro...
