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作者：Veldkamp, LL
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Many asset markets exhibit slow booms and sudden crashes. This pattern is explained by an endogenous flow of information. In the model, agents undertake more economic activity in good times than in bad. Economic activity generates public information about the state of the economy. If the economic state changes when times are good and information is abundant, asset prices adjust quickly and a sudden crash occurs. When times are bad, scarce information and high uncertainty slow agents' reactions...
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作者：Cho, IK
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
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作者：Le Van, C; Vailakis, Y
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：In this paper, we propose a unifying approach to the study of recursive economic problems. Postulating an aggregator function as the fundamental expression of tastes, we explore conditions under which a utility function can be constructed. We also modify the usual dynamic programming arguments to include this class of models. We show that Bellman's equation still holds, so many results known for the additively separable case can be generalized for this general description of preferences. Our a...
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作者：Barberà, S; Massó, J; Neme, A
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET)
摘要：We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Bogomolnaia, A; Moulin, H; Stong, R
作者单位：Rice University; Rice University
摘要：Agents partition deterministic outcomes into good or bad. A mechanism selects a lottery over outcomes (time-shares). The probability of a good outcome is the canonical utility. The utilitarian mechanism averages over outcomes with largest approval. It is efficient, strategyproof, anonymous and neutral. We reach an impossibility if, in addition, each agent's utility is at least 1/n, where n is the number of agents; or is at least the fraction of good to feasible outcomes. We conjecture that no ...
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作者：Chambers, CP
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper studies the classical land division problem formalized by Steinhaus (Econometrica 16 (1948) 101-104) in a multi-profile context. We propose a notion of an allocation rule for this setting. We discuss several examples of rules and properties they may satisfy. Central among these properties is division independence: a parcel may be partitioned into smaller parcels, these smaller parcels allocated according to the rule, leaving a recommended allocation for the original parcel. In conju...
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作者：Spiegler, R
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：Under most game-theoretic solution concepts, equilibrium beliefs are justified by off-equilibrium events. I propose an equilibrium concept for infinitely repeated games, called Nash Equilibrium with Tests (NEWT), according to which players can only justify their equilibrium beliefs with events that take place on the equilibrium path itself. In NEWT, players test every threat that rationalizes a future non-myopic action that they take. The tests are an integral part of equilibrium behavior. Cha...
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作者：Zhu, T
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：Existence of a monetary steady state is established in a random matching model with divisible goods, divisible money, an arbitrary bound on individual money holdings, and take-it-or-leave-it offers by consumers. The monetary steady state shown to exist has nice properties: the value function, defined on money holdings, is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and the distribution over money holdings has full support. The approach is to show that the limit of the nice steady states for indi...
