-
作者：Laraki, R; Solan, E; Vieille, N
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; heSam Universite; Conservatoire National Arts & Metiers (CNAM); Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect epsilon-equilibrium, for each epsilon > 0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Spear, SE; Wang, C
作者单位：Iowa State University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Existing models of dynamic contracts impose that it is both optimal and feasible for the contracting parties to bind themselves together forever. This paper introduces optimal termination in dynamic contracts. We modify the standard dynamic agency model to include an external labor market which, upon the dissolution of the contract, allows the firm to return to the labor market to seek a new match. Under this simple closure of the model, two types of terminations emerge. Under one scenario, th...
-
作者：Rampini, AA
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper studies how default varies with aggregate income. We analyze a model in which optimal contracts enable risk sharing of privately observed, idiosyncratic income by allowing for default. Default provisions allow agents with low idiosyncratic income realizations to repay less and thus provide insurance. Default penalties ensure that only these agents default. We show that default can occur under the optimal contract and that default provisions vary with aggregate income. We provide con...
-
作者：Jehiel, P
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; University of London; University College London
摘要：In complex situations, agents use simplified representations to learn how their environment may react. I assume that agents bundle nodes at which other agents must move into analogy classes. and agents only try to learn the average behavior in every class. Specifically, I propose a new solution concept for multi-stage games with perfect information: at every node players choose best-responses to their analogy-based expectations, and expectations correctly represent the average behavior in ever...
-
作者：Modica, S; Scarsini, M
作者单位：University of Turin; University of Palermo
摘要：We provide comparative global conditions for downside risk aversion, which are similar to the ones studied by Ross for risk aversion. We define a coefficient of downside risk aversion, and study its local properties. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Espino, E
摘要：In his seminal paper of 1928, Ramsey conjectured that if agents discounted the future differently, in the long run all agents except the most patient would live at the subsistence level. The validity of this conjecture was investigated in different environments. In particular, it has been confirmed in the neoclassical growth model with dynamically complete markets. This paper studies this conjecture in a version of this model that includes private information and heterogeneous agents. A versio...
-
作者：Berger, U
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：It is known that every discrete-time fictitious play process approaches equilibrium in nondegenerate 2 x 2 games, and that every continuous-time fictitious play process approaches equilibrium in nondegenerate 2 x 2 and 2 x 3 games. It has also been conjectured that convergence to the set of equilibria holds generally for nondegenerate 2 x n games. We give a simple geometric proof of this for the continuous-time process, and also extend the result to discrete-time fictitious play. (C) 2004 Else...
-
作者：Szentes, B
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：I develop a method that transforms an equilibrium strategy profile from one auction to another. The method is constructive and does not require complicated computation. This provides a new approach to revenue equivalence and extends the theorem to domains where it had not previously been known, in particular to simultaneous multiple object auctions with complete information and to auction environments having correlated private values and common values. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Cho, IK; Matsui, A
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Tokyo
摘要：We study infinitely repeated symmetric 2x2 games played by bounded rational agents who follow a simple rule of thumb: each agent continues to play the same action if the current payoff exceeds the average of the past payoffs, and switches to the other action with a positive probability otherwise. By applying the stochastic approximation technique, we characterize the asymptotic outcomes for all 2x2 games. In the prisoners' dilemma game, for example, the players cooperate in the limit if and on...
-
作者：Fraser, CD
作者单位：University of Leicester
摘要：This note corrects a slip in Fraser's (J. Econ. Theory 90 (2000) 204-221) treatment of the necessary condition for partial separation of efficiency from distribution in providing a club good. His corrected Theorem 1 shows that many families of utility function can generate partial (and total) separation, thereby considerably extending the scope of his analysis. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
