-
作者：Anderson, EW
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：This paper describes Pareto optimal allocations when agents have risk-sensitive preferences as formulated by Hansen and Sargent (IEEE Trans. Automat. Control 40(5) (1995) 968-971). Necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the existence and stability of steady states at which Pareto weights are time-invariant. When all agents are risk-sensitive with the same power reward function there is a unique interior steady state which is stable when the power is positive and unstable when the po...
-
作者：Manzini, P; Mariotti, M
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：Negotiations often occur not between individuals but among groups (companies, trade unions, political parties, etc.) each representing composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural model of such circumstances. We formalise the notion of 'alliance' and show how different preference aggregation procedures within the alliance affect the bargaining outcome. In particular, we find that unanimity procedures lead...
-
作者：D'Agata, A
作者单位：University of Catania
摘要：This paper provides sufficient (as well as necessary) conditions for the integral of a correspondence defined on a measure space with atoms to exhibit star-shaped values. This result is used to analyze the existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with a measure space of agents with atoms and of a competitive equilibrium in economies with mixed markets. In either case it is shown that an exact equilibrium exists whenever atoms are small enough. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Ghirardato, P; Maccheroni, F; Marinacci, M
作者单位：University of Turin; University of Turin; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：Economists often operate under an implicit assumption that the tastes of a decision maker are quite stable, while his beliefs change with the availability of new information. We show that for a general class of preferences, a separation of a key component of tastes, the utility function, from the other components of the representation is possible only if the decision maker's preferences satisfy a mild but not completely innocuous condition, called 'certainty independence'. We also outline the ...
-
作者：Sandholm, WH
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We consider a model of evolution in games in which agents occasionally receive opportunities to switch strategies, choosing between them using a probabilistic rule. Both the rate at which revision opportunities arrive and the probabilities with which each strategy is chosen are functions of current normalized payoffs. We call the aggregate dynamics induced by this model excess payoff dynamics. We show that every excess payoff dynamic is well-behaved: regardless of the underlying game, each exc...
-
作者：Battaglini, M; Bénabou, R; Tirole, J
作者单位：Princeton University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Social influences on self-control underlie both self-help groups and many peer interactions among youths. To understand these phenomena, we analyze how observing each other's behavior affects individuals' ability to deal with their own impulses. These endogenous informational spillovers lead to either a unique good news equilibrium that ameliorates behavior, a unique bad news equilibrium that worsens it, or to the coexistence of both. A welfare analysis shows that people will find social inter...
-
作者：Bogomolnaia, A; Deb, R; Ehlers, L
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Rice University; Southern Methodist University
摘要：We consider the problem of efficiently allocating several indivisible objects between agents who are to receive at most one object and whose preferences are private information. We examine this standard assignment problem from the perspective of mechanism design giving up the usual assumption of linear preferences and instead using a full preference domain (with indifferences permitted). We characterize two classes of mechanisms: (i) Bi-polar Serially Dictatorial Rules by Essential Single-Valu...
-
作者：Hatfield, JW
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：In their recent paper, Roth et al. [Pairwise kidney exchange, J. Econ. Theory 125 (2005) 151-188] consider pairwise kidney exchanges, and show within this subset of feasible exchanges that a priority mechanism is strategy-proof. We show that this result can be broadened to allow much more general mechanisms and restrictions on the feasible set of allocations, including allowing three-way exchanges, regional specifications, and others. The key requirement is that the choice mechanism be consist...
-
作者：Sveen, T; Weinke, L
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Norges Bank
摘要：Our main result is that dynamic new-Keynesian (DNK) models with firm-specific capital feature a substantial amount of endogenous price stickiness. We use this insight to assess the desirability of alternative interest rate rules, and make the case for combining active monetary policy with interest rate smoothing and/or some responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to real economic activity. The key mechanism behind our results is also useful from a positive point of view: the feature of fir...
-
作者：Barbera, S; Dutta, B; Sen, A
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
