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作者：Anderson, EW
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：This paper describes Pareto optimal allocations when agents have risk-sensitive preferences as formulated by Hansen and Sargent (IEEE Trans. Automat. Control 40(5) (1995) 968-971). Necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the existence and stability of steady states at which Pareto weights are time-invariant. When all agents are risk-sensitive with the same power reward function there is a unique interior steady state which is stable when the power is positive and unstable when the po...
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作者：Sandholm, WH
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We consider a model of evolution in games in which agents occasionally receive opportunities to switch strategies, choosing between them using a probabilistic rule. Both the rate at which revision opportunities arrive and the probabilities with which each strategy is chosen are functions of current normalized payoffs. We call the aggregate dynamics induced by this model excess payoff dynamics. We show that every excess payoff dynamic is well-behaved: regardless of the underlying game, each exc...
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作者：Battaglini, M; Bénabou, R; Tirole, J
作者单位：Princeton University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Social influences on self-control underlie both self-help groups and many peer interactions among youths. To understand these phenomena, we analyze how observing each other's behavior affects individuals' ability to deal with their own impulses. These endogenous informational spillovers lead to either a unique good news equilibrium that ameliorates behavior, a unique bad news equilibrium that worsens it, or to the coexistence of both. A welfare analysis shows that people will find social inter...
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作者：Bogomolnaia, A; Deb, R; Ehlers, L
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Rice University; Southern Methodist University
摘要：We consider the problem of efficiently allocating several indivisible objects between agents who are to receive at most one object and whose preferences are private information. We examine this standard assignment problem from the perspective of mechanism design giving up the usual assumption of linear preferences and instead using a full preference domain (with indifferences permitted). We characterize two classes of mechanisms: (i) Bi-polar Serially Dictatorial Rules by Essential Single-Valu...
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作者：Hatfield, JW
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：In their recent paper, Roth et al. [Pairwise kidney exchange, J. Econ. Theory 125 (2005) 151-188] consider pairwise kidney exchanges, and show within this subset of feasible exchanges that a priority mechanism is strategy-proof. We show that this result can be broadened to allow much more general mechanisms and restrictions on the feasible set of allocations, including allowing three-way exchanges, regional specifications, and others. The key requirement is that the choice mechanism be consist...
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作者：Barbera, S; Dutta, B; Sen, A
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
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作者：Saez-Marti, M; Weibull, JW
作者单位：Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：Is discounting of future decision-makers' consumption utilities consistent with pure altruism toward those decision-makers, that is, a concern that they are better off according to their own, likewise forward-looking, preferences? It turns out that the answer is positive for many but not all discount functions used in the economics literature. In particular, hyperbolic discounting of the form used by Phelps and Pollak (Rev. Econ. Studies 35 (1968) 201) and Laibson (Quart. J. Econ. 112 (1997) 4...
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作者：Kawamura, E
作者单位：Universidad de San Andres Argentina
摘要：This paper investigates an extension of the GEI-unawareness framework by Modica et al. (Econ. Theory 12 (1998) 259) to economies with entrepreneurial production. Existence of equilibrium is guaranteed given decreasing returns to scale. Firm's value and investment decision in equilibrium are characterized. An example of commodity innovation shows that the effect of different degrees of awareness on investment decisions depend upon the degree of risk aversion. In the case of log preferences unaw...
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作者：Evans, GW; Guesnerie, R
作者单位：University of Oregon; Universite PSL; College de France
摘要：We examine local strong rationality (LSR) in multivariate models with both forward-lookin expectations and predetermined variables. Given hypothetical common knowledge restrictions that the dynamics will be close to those of a specified minimal state variable solution, we obtain eductive stability conditions for the solution to be LSR. In the saddlepoint stable case the saddle-path solution is LSR provided the model is structurally homogeneous across agents. However, the eductive stability con...
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作者：Inderst, R
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper considers a market with adverse selection in the spirit of Rothschild and Stiglitz (Quart. J. Econ. 90 (1976) 629). The major departure from existing approaches is that we model a decentralized market that is open-ended and constantly refilled by new participants, e.g., by new workers and firms in the case of a labor market. The major novelty of this approach is that the distribution of types in the market becomes an endogenous variable, which is jointly determined with equilibrium ...
