Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Maniquet, F; Sprumont, Y
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.004
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 155-174
• 关键词: fairness; excludable non-rival good; welfare egalitarianism; social orderings

摘要

We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the properties that individual welfare levels below the stand-alone lower bound (respectively, above the unanimity upper bound) should be increased (respectively, reduced). Combining either property with efficiency and robustness properties with respect to changes in the set of agents, we obtain a kind of welfare egalitarianism based on a constructed numerical representation of individual preferences. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.