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作者：Tan, Guofu; Yilankaya, Okan
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of Southern California
摘要：We investigate equilibria of sealed-bid second price auctions with bidder participation costs; in the independent private values environment. We focus on equilibria in cutoff strategies (participate and bid the valuation iff it is greater than the cutoff), since if a bidder finds it optimal to participate, she cannot do better than bidding her valuation. When bidders are symmetric, concavity (strict convexity) of the cumulative distribution function from which the valuations are drawn is a suf...
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作者：Siniscalchi, Marciano
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Recent decision theories represent ambiguity via multiple priors, interpreted as alternative probabilistic models of the relevant uncertainty. This paper provides a robust behavioral foundation for this interpretation. A prior P is plausible if preferences over some subset of acts admit an expected utility representation with prior P, but not with any other prior Q not equal P. Under suitable axioms, plausible priors can be elicited from preferences, and fully characterize them; also, probabil...
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作者：McBride, M
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：Individuals in many social networks imperfectly monitor other individuals' network relationships. This paper shows that, in a model of a communication network, imperfect monitoring leads to the existence of many inefficient equilibria. Reasonable restrictions on actions or on beliefs about others' actions can, however, eliminate many of these inefficient equilibria even with imperfect monitoring. Star networks, known to be efficient in many settings, are shown to have desirable monitoring char...
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作者：Pérez-Castrillo, D; Wettstein, D
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for transferable utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and f...
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作者：Ali, S. Nageeb M.
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study multilateral bargaining games where agents disagree over their bargaining power. We show that if agents are extremely optimistic, there may be costly delays in an arbitrarily long finite game but if optimism is moderate, all sufficiently long games end in immediate agreement. We show that the game with extreme optimism is highly unstable in the finite-horizon, and we examine the ramifications of this instability on the infinite-horizon problem. Finally, we consider other voting rules,...
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作者：Kyle, Albert S.; Ou-Yang, Hui; Xiong, Wei
作者单位：Duke University; Princeton University
摘要：We solve a liquidation problem for an agent with preferences consistent with the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky [Econornetrica 47 (1979) 263-291]. We find that the agent is willing to hold a risky project with a relatively inferior Sharpe ratio if the project is currently making losses. and intends to liquidate it when it breaks even. On the other hand. the agent may liquidate a project with a relatively superior Sharpe ratio if its current profits rise or drop to the break-even point...
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作者：Katta, Akshay-Kumar; Sethuraman, Jay
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：We consider the problem of allocating a set of indivisible objects to agents in a fair and efficient manner. In a recent paper, Bogomolnaia and Moulin consider the case in which all agents have strict preferences, and propose the probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism; they define a new notion of efficiency, called ordinal efficiency, and prove that the probabilistic serial mechanism finds an envy-free ordinally efficient assignment. However, the restrictive assumption of strict preferences is cr...
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作者：Citanna, A.; Polemarchakis, H. M.; Tirelli, M.
作者单位：Columbia University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Brown University; Sapienza University Rome
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作者：Horst, Ulrich; Scheinkman, Jose A.
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In this paper, we establish existence and uniqueness results for equilibria in systems with an infinite number of agents and with local and global social interactions. We also examine the structure of the equilibrium distribution and derive a Markov property for the equilibrium distribution of a class of spatially homogeneous systems. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Birulin, Oleksii
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：I consider the problem of the efficient provision of a congested (limited capacity) public good in a setting with asymmetric information. I show. in particular. that when the capacity of the good is limited, in a wide class of economies it is possible to Construct an incentive compatible mechanism that always produces the good at the efficient level. balances the budget and satisfies voluntary participation constraints. This result is in contrast with the corresponding impossibiliry result for...
