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作者：Jordan, J. S.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：This paper introduces a class of coalitional games, called pillage games, as a model of Hobbesian anarchy. Any coalition can pillage, costlessly and with certainty, any less powerful coalition. Power is endogenous, so a pillage game does not have a characteristic function, but pillage provides a domination concept that defines a stable set, which represents an endogenous balance of power. Every stable set contains only finitely many allocations, and can be represented as a farsighted core. Add...
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作者：Hidvegi, Zoltan; Wang, Wenli; Whinston, Andrew B.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Emory University
摘要：Consider an English auction for a single object in which there is an option for a bidder to guarantee a purchase at a seller-specified buy price b at any time. We show that there exist (nu) over bar and (nu) over cap (>= (nu) over bar). such that a bidder purchases at the buy price immediately if his valuation nu is no less than (nu) over cap or (nu) over bar <= nu <= b and at least one other bidder is participating in the auction. If b <= nu < (nu) over bar, he purchases at the buy price once...
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作者：Sethuraman, Jay; Teo, Chung-Piaw; Vohra, Rakesh V.
作者单位：Columbia University; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU); National University of Singapore; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper presents two results about preference domain conditions that deepen our understanding of anonymous and monotonic Arrovian social welfare functions (ASWFs). We characterize the class of anonymous and monotonic ASWFs on domains without Condorcet triples. This extends and generalizes an earlier characterization (as Generalized Majority Rules) by Moulin (Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making., Cambridge University Press, New York, 1988) for single-peaked domains. We also describe a doma...
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作者：Zhao, Rui R.
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：Renegotiation-proof contracts are studied in infinitely repeated principal-agent problem. Contracts satisfying a weaker notion of renegotiation-proofness always exist. The renegotiation-proof value function has a simple characterization: It is the principal's optimal value function when an appropriate lower bound is placed on the agent's expected utility. Sufficient conditions are provided for renegotiation-proof value function in finite horizon to converge to renegotiation-proof value functio...
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作者：Fang, HM; Morris, S
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：We consider parametric examples of symmetric two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes her own private Valuation as well as noisy signals about her opponent's private valuation. We show that, in such environments, the revenue equivalence between the first and second price auctions (SPAs) breaks down and there is no definite revenue ranking; while the SPA is always efficient allocatively, the first price auction (FPA) may be inefficient; equilibria may fail to exist for th...
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作者：Liski, Matti; Montero, Juan-Pablo
作者单位：Aalto University; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：We consider an infinitely repeated oligopoly in which at each period firms not only serve the spot market by either competing in prices or quantities but also have the opportunity to trade forward contracts. Contrary to the pro-competitive results of finite-horizon models, we find that the possibility of forward trading allows firms to sustain collusive profits that otherwise would not be possible to achieve. The result holds both for price and quantity competition and follows because (collusi...
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作者：Hansen, Lars Peter; Sargent, Thomas J.; Turmuhambetova, Gauhar; Williams, Noah
作者单位：New York University; University of Chicago; Princeton University
摘要：A decision maker fears that data are generated by a statistical perturbation of an approximating model that is either a controlled diffusion or a controlled measure over continuous functions of time. A perturbation is constrained in terms of its relative entropy. Several different two-player zero-sum games that yield robust decision rules are related to one another, to the max-min expected utility theory of Gilboa and Schmeidler [Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior, J. Math. Econ. 18...
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作者：Maccheroni, Fabio; Marinacci, Massimo; Rustichini, Aldo
作者单位：University of Turin; University of Turin; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We introduce and aximatize dynamic variational preferences, the dynamic version of the variational preferences we axiomatized in [F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci, A. Rustichini, Ambiguity aversion, robustness, and the variational representation of preferences, Mimeo, 2004], which generalize the multiple priors preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler [Maxmin expected utility with a non-unique prior, J. Math. Econ. 18 (1989) 141-153], and include the Multiplier Preferences inspired by robust control an...
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作者：Kesten, O
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：We consider the priority-based allocation problem: there is a set of indivisible objects with multiple supplies (e.g., schools with seats) and a set of agents (e.g., students) with priorities over objects (e.g., proximity of residence area). We study two well-known and competing mechanisms. The agent-optimal stable mechanism (AOSM) allots objects via the deferred acceptance algorithm. The top trading cycles mechanism (TTCM) allots objects via Gale's top trading cycles algorithm. We show that t...
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作者：Nirei, M
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; Utah State University
摘要：This paper concerns a propagation mechanism in an economy where many individuals follow a threshold rule and interact with a positive feedback. We derive an asymptotic distribution of the propagation size when the number of the agents tends to infinity. The propagation distribution exhibits a slower convergence to a deterministic value than it would if the agents followed a smooth adjustment policy. This gives rise to significant aggregate fluctuations in a finite lumpy-adjusting economy even ...
