Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tan, Guofu; Yilankaya, Okan
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.008
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 205-219
• 关键词: second price auctions; participation cost; entry fee; multiplicity of equilibria

摘要

We investigate equilibria of sealed-bid second price auctions with bidder participation costs; in the independent private values environment. We focus on equilibria in cutoff strategies (participate and bid the valuation iff it is greater than the cutoff), since if a bidder finds it optimal to participate, she cannot do better than bidding her valuation. When bidders are symmetric, concavity (strict convexity) of the cumulative distribution function from which the valuations are drawn is a sufficient condition for uniqueness (multiplicity) within this class. We also study a special case with asymmetric bidders and show that concavity/convexity plays a similar role. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.