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作者：Berliant, Marcus; Kung, Fan-chin
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Academia Sinica - Taiwan; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：We study the indeterminacy of equilibrium in the Fujita-Krugman [When is the economy monocentric?: von Thunen and Chamberlin unified, Reg. Sci. Urban Econ. 25 (1995) 505-528] model of city formation under monopolistic competition and increasing returns. Both the number and the locations of cities are endogenously determined. Assuming smooth transportation costs, we examine equilibria in city-economies where a finite number of cities form endogenously. For any positive integer K, the set of equ...
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作者：Caplin, Andrew; Leahy, John
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We introduce a new class of finite horizon stochastic decision problems in which preferences change over time, and provide a proof of the existence of a recursively optimal strategy. Recursive optimization techniques dominate many areas of economic dynamics. However, in decision problems in which tastes change over time, the solution technique most commonly applied is not recursive, but rather strategic (subgame perfection). In this paper we argue in favor of the recursive approach, and we tak...
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作者：Genicot, Garance; Ray, Debraj
作者单位：Georgetown University; New York University
摘要：A single principal interacts with several agents, offering them contracts. The crucial assumption of this paper is that the outside-option payoffs of the agents depend positively on how many uncontracted or free agents there are. We study how such a principal, unwelcome though he may be, approaches the problem of contract provision to agents when coordination failure among the latter group is explicitly ruled out. Two variants are considered. When the principal cannot re-approach agents, there...
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作者：Gekker, Ruvin; van Hees, Martin
作者单位：University of Groningen; Ollscoil na Gaillimhe-University of Galway
摘要：The paper explores the possibility of analyzing opportunities within a logical framework. We make clear how a person's freedom in different choice situations yield opportunity rankings by showing how such rankings are completely determined by subjacent logical chains. We explore one interpretation of such chains in particular, and show that it leads to results similar to those obtained earlier by Nehring and Puppe. Furthermore, for contexts in which not all of the consequences of one's acts ar...
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作者：Phelan, Christopher
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：This study presents a simple model of government reputation (in which government type cannot be directly observed by households) with the variation that government type, rather than being permanent, follows an exogenous Markov process. This formulation captures three characteristics of bad policy outcomes: governments which betray public trust do so erratically, public trust is regained only gradually after a betrayal, and governments with recent betrayals betray with higher probability than o...
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作者：Ottaviani, M; Sorensen, PN
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; University of Copenhagen
摘要：This paper studies strategic communication by an expert who is concerned about appearing to be well informed. The expert is assumed to observe a private signal with a simple and particularly tractable (multiplicative linear) structure. The quality of the expert's information is evaluated on the basis of the advice given and the realized state of the world. In equilibrium of this reputational cheap-talk game, no more than two messages are effectively reported. The model is extended to consider ...
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作者：Chen, Y; Sönmez, T
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Koc University
摘要：We present an experimental study of three school choice mechanisms. The Boston mechanism is influential in practice, while the Gale-Shapley and Top Trading Cycles mechanisms have superior theoretical properties. Consistent with theory, this study indicates a high preference manipulation rate under Boston. As a result, efficiency under Boston is significantly lower than that of the two competing mechanisms in the designed environment. However, contrary to theory, Gale-Shapley outperforms Top Tr...
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作者：Guo, Ming; Ou-Yang, Hui
作者单位：Duke University; Duke University
摘要：Two of the most widely tested predictions of agency theory are that there exists a negative association between an agent's pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) and the risk of output, and that PPS enhances performance. Empirical evidence has been mixed. This paper proposes a new utility function and develops a model that introduces a wealth effect and also allows the agent to control the (idiosyncratic) risk of output. When risk is endogenous, the paper shows that the two predictions may not hold...
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作者：Dietrich, F
作者单位：University of Konstanz
摘要：The aggregation of individual judgments over interrelated propositions is a newly arising field of social choice theory. I introduce several independence conditions on judgment aggregation rules, each of which protects against a specific type of manipulation by agenda setters or voters. I derive impossibility theorems whereby these independence conditions are incompatible with certain minimal requirements. Unlike earlier impossibility results, the main result here holds for any (non-trivial) a...
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作者：Feichtinger, G; Hartl, RF; Kort, PM; Veliov, VM
作者单位：Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Technische Universitat Wien; University of Vienna; University of Antwerp; Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
摘要：Due to embodied technological progress new generations of capital goods are more productive. Therefore, in order to study the effects of technological progress, a model must be analyzed in which different generations of capital goods can be distinguished. We determine in what way the firm adjusts current investments to predictions of technological progress. In the presence of market power we show that a negative anticipation effect occurs, i.e. Current investments in recent generations of capi...
