Imperfect monitoring in communication networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McBride, M
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Irvine
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.003
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 97-119
• 关键词: Social networks; uncertainty; INFORMATION; efficiericy; star networks

摘要

Individuals in many social networks imperfectly monitor other individuals' network relationships. This paper shows that, in a model of a communication network, imperfect monitoring leads to the existence of many inefficient equilibria. Reasonable restrictions on actions or on beliefs about others' actions can, however, eliminate many of these inefficient equilibria even with imperfect monitoring. Star networks, known to be efficient in many settings, are shown to have desirable monitoring characteristics. More generally, this paper provides a formal framework in which to study incorrect perceptions as an equilibrium phenomenon in social networks. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.