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作者：Citanna, A; Polemarchakis, HM; Tirelli, M
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Columbia University; Brown University; Sapienza University Rome
摘要：When the asset market is incomplete, there typically exist taxes on trades in assets that are Pareto improving. This fiscal policy is anonymous, it is fully and correctly anticipated by traders, and it results in ex post Pareto optimal allocations; as such, it improves over previously proposed constrained interventions. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Chattopadhyay, Subir
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Colegio de Mexico
摘要：We considergeneral OLG economies under uncertainty, with short maturity assets and with dividend paying assets of infinite maturity and fiat money, and study the optimality properties of equilibria with a sequence of asset markets that are sequentially complete. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions, in terms of asset prices and dividends, for equilibria to be conditionally Pareto optimal. These results provide a theoretical basis for empirical investigation. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. Al...
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作者：Strausz, R
作者单位：Free University of Berlin
摘要：This paper shows that, contrary to what is generally believed, decreasing concavity of the agent's utility function with respect to the screening variable is not sufficient to ensure that stochastic mechanisms are suboptimal. The paper demonstrates, however, that they are suboptimal whenever the optimal deterministic mechanism exhibits no bunching. This is the case for most applications of the theory and therefore validates the literature's usual focus on deterministic mechanisms. (c) 2005 Els...
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作者：Bergemann, D; Välimäki, J
作者单位：Aalto University; Yale University
摘要：We consider the model of price competition for a single buyer among many sellers in a dynamic environment. The surplus from each trade is allowed to depend on the path of previous purchases, and as a result, the model captures phenomena such as learning by doing and habit formation in consumption. We characterize Markovian equilibria for finite and infinite horizon versions of the model and show that the stationary infinite horizon version of the model possesses an efficient equilibrium where ...
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作者：Manelli, AM; Vincent, DR
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Multiple objects may be sold by posting a schedule consisting of one price for each possible bundle and permitting the buyer to select the price-bundle pair of his choice. We identify conditions that must be satisfied by any price schedule that maximizes revenue within the class of all such schedules. We then provide conditions under which a price schedule maximizes expected revenue within the class of all incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms in the n-object case. We use t...
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作者：Moldovanu, B; Sela, A
作者单位：University of Bonn; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：A contest architecture specifies how the contestants are split among several sub-contests whose winners compete against each other (while other players are eliminated). We compare the performance of such dynamic schemes to that of static winner-take-all contests from the point of view of a designer who maximizes either the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. For the case of a linear cost of effort, our main results are: (1) If the designer maximizes expected total effort, the...
