Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, discounting, and Nash bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kultti, Klaus; Vartiainen, Hannu
• 署名单位: University of Helsinki
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.11.006
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 721-728
• 关键词: vNM stable sets; discounting; Nash bargaining

摘要

We establish a link between von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set and the Nash solution in a general n-player utility set. The stable set-solution is defined with respect to a dominance relation: payoff vector u dominates v if one player prefers u even with one period delay. We show that a stable set exists and, if the utility set has a smooth surface, any stable set converges to the Nash bargaining solution when the length of the period goes to zero. (c) 2007 Published by Elsevier Inc.