Contests with limited resources

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kvasov, Dmitriy
• 署名单位: University of Auckland
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.007
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 738-748
• 关键词: Contests; budget restrictions; blotto game; All-pay auctions

摘要

Many interesting phenomena (electoral competition, R&D races, lobbying) are instances of multiple simultaneous contests with unconditional commitment of limited resources. Specifically, the following game is analyzed. Two players compete in a number of simultaneous contests. The players have limited resources (budgets) and must decide how to allocate these to the different contests. In each contest the player who expends more resources than his adversary wins a corresponding prize. Mixed-strategy equilibria are characterized in the case of identical values and budgets and the connections with the classical Blotto game are analyzed. AN (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.