Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sun, Yeneng; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.001
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 175-194
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; Perfect competition; Pareto efficiency; Walrasian allocation; incentive compatibility; negligible private information

摘要

The idea of perfect competition for an economy with asymmetric information is formalized via an idiosyncratic signal process in which the private signals of almost every individual agent can influence only a negligible group of agents, and the individual agents' relevant signals are essentially pairwise independent conditioned on the true states of nature. Thus, there is no incentive for an individual agent to manipulate her private information. The existence of incentive compatible, ex post Walrasian allocations is shown for such a perfectly competitive asymmetric information economy with or without common values. Consequently, the conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency is resolved exactly, and its asymptotic version is derived for a sequence of large, but finite private information economies. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.