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作者：Dietrich, Franz
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：The new field of judgment aggregation aims to find collective judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that, fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions like if a then b are adequately modelled, namely as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and compl...
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作者：Dokow, Elad; Holzman, Ron
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We study a general aggregation problem in which a society has to determine its position (yes/no) on each of several issues, based on the positions of the members of the society on those issues. There is a prescribed set of feasible evaluations, i.e., permissible combinations of positions on the issues. This framework for the theory of aggregation was introduced by Wilson and further developed by Rubinstein and Fishburn. Among other things, it admits the modeling of preference aggregation (wher...
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作者：Jouini, Elyes; Marin, Jean-Michel; Napp, Clotilde
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Universite de Montpellier; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：Agents impatience rate and their anticipations about the future of the economy, are two essential determinants of the equilibrium discount rate, as illustrated by the Ramsey formula. Heterogeneity in time preference rates and in anticipations is widely acknowledged. Our objective is to determine the equilibrium discount rate when this heterogeneity is taken into account. Among others we tackle the following questions: As an additional risk or uncertainty, can dispersion in agents characteristi...
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作者：Oyama, Daisuke; Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics
摘要：This paper considers the robustness of equilibria to a small amount of incomplete information, where players are allowed to have heterogeneous priors. An equilibrium of a complete information game is robust to incomplete information under non-common priors if for every incomplete information game where each player's prior assigns high probability on the event that the players know at arbitrarily high order that the payoffs are given by the complete information game, there exists a Bayesian Nas...
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作者：Ivanov, Maxim
作者单位：McMaster University
摘要：This paper investigates communication between an informed expert and an uninformed principal via a strategic mediator. We demonstrate that, for any bias in the parties' preferences, there exists a strategic mediator that provides the highest expected payoff to the principal, as if the players had communicated through an optimal non-strategic mediator. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Ochs, Jack; Park, In-Uck
作者单位：University of Bristol; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We analyze a multi-period entry game among privately informed agents who differ with respect to the number of agents who must enter in order for their own entry to be profitable. In each period agents who have not yet joined decide whether to subscribe to a network. There exists a unique equilibrium that approximates any symmetric equilibrium arbitrarily closely as the discount factor approaches one. This resolves the coordination problem. Ex-post efficiency is necessarily achieved asymptotica...
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作者：Gollier, Christian
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：Which rates should we use to discount costs and benefits of different natures at different time horizons? We answer this question by considering a representative agent consuming two goods whose availability evolves over time in a stochastic way. We extend the Ramsey rule by taking into account the degree of substitutability between the two goods and of the uncertainty surrounding the economic and environmental growths. The rate at which environmental impacts should be discounted is in general ...
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作者：Schabert, Andreas
作者单位：Dortmund University of Technology; University of Amsterdam
摘要：This paper examines equilibrium determination under different monetary policy regimes when the government might default on its debt. We apply a cash-in-advance model where the government does not have access to non-distortionary taxation and does not account for initial outstanding debt when it sets the income tax rate. Solvency is then not guaranteed and sovereign default can affect the return on public debt. If the central bank sets the interest rate in a conventional way, the equilibrium al...
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作者：Dietrich, Franz; Mongin, Philippe
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In the framework of judgment aggregation, we assume that some formulas of the agenda are singled out as premisses, and that both Independence (formula-wise aggregation) and Unanimity Preservation hold for them. Whether premiss-based aggregation thus defined is compatible with conclusion-based aggregation, as defined by Unanimity Preservation on the non-premisses, depends on how the premisses are logically connected, both among themselves and with other formulas. We state necessary and sufficie...
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作者：Brandenburger, Adam; Friedenberg, Amanda
作者单位：New York University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Best-response sets (Pearce, 1984 [28]) characterize the epistemic condition of rationality and common belief of rationality. When rationality incorporates a weak-dominance (admissibility) requirement, the self-admissible set (SAS) concept (Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler, 2008 [17]) characterizes rationality and common assumption of rationality. We analyze the behavior of SAS's in some games of interest-Centipede, the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chain Store. We then estab...
