Self-admissible sets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brandenburger, Adam; Friedenberg, Amanda
• 署名单位: New York University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.11.003
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 785-811
• 关键词: Admissibility; Weak dominance; Self-admissible sets; Iterated admissibility; Epistemic game theory; Perfect-information games

摘要

Best-response sets (Pearce, 1984 [28]) characterize the epistemic condition of rationality and common belief of rationality. When rationality incorporates a weak-dominance (admissibility) requirement, the self-admissible set (SAS) concept (Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler, 2008 [17]) characterizes rationality and common assumption of rationality. We analyze the behavior of SAS's in some games of interest-Centipede, the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chain Store. We then establish some general properties of SAS's, including a characterization in perfect-information games. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.