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作者：Dokow, Elad; Holzman, Ron
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：A general model of aggregation of binary evaluations over interrelated issues, introduced by Wilson and further studied by Rubinstein and Fishburn and by the authors, is extended here to allow for abstentions on some of the issues. It is shown that the same structural conditions on the set of feasible evaluations that lead to dictatorship in the model without abstentions, lead to oligarchy in the presence of abstentions. Arrow's impossibility theorem for social welfare functions, Gibbard's oli...
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作者：Nehring, Klaus; Puppe, Clemens
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We study the judgment aggregation problem from the perspective of justifying a particular collective decision by a corresponding aggregation on the criteria. In particular, we characterize the logical relations between the decision and the criteria that enable justification of a majority decision through a proposition-wise aggregation rule with no veto power on the criteria. While the well-studied doctrinal paradox provides a negative example in which no such justification exists, we show that...
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作者：Dietrich, Franz; List, Christian
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments sufficient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic social-choice-theoretic domain conditions, others have no counterpart. Our most general condition genera...
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作者：Krasa, Stefan; Polborn, Mattias
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We introduce a model of electoral competition with office-motivated candidates who are exogenously committed to particular positions on some issues, while they choose positions for the remaining issues. A position is majority-efficient if a candidate cannot make a majority of the electorate better off, given his fixed positions. We characterize existence conditions for majority-efficient positions. The candidates' fixed positions in our framework imply that only some voters are swing voters, a...
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作者：Moscarini, Giuseppe; Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：University of Essex; Yale University; University of Brescia
摘要：We study a winner-take-all R&D race between two firms that are privately informed about the arrival rate of an invention. Over time, each firm only observes whether the opponent left the race or not. The equilibrium displays a strong herding effect, that we call a 'survivor's curse.' Unlike in the case of symmetric information, the two firms may quit the race (nearly) simultaneously even when their costs and benefits for research differ significantly. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：List, Christian; Polak, Ben
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Yale University; Yale University; University of London; London Business School
摘要：This introduces the symposium on judgment aggregation. The theory of judgment aggregation asks how several individuals' judgments on some logically connected propositions can be aggregated into consistent collective judgments. The aim of this introduction is to show how ideas from the familiar theory of preference aggregation can be extended to this more general case. We first translate a proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem into the new setting, so as to motivate some of the central concept...
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作者：Ivanov, Maxim
作者单位：McMaster University
摘要：This paper focuses on issues of allocating authority between an uninformed principal and an informed expert. We analyze the benefits of informational control-restricting the precision of the expert's information (without learning its content). In this case, the result of Dessein (2002) [8] that delegating decisions to a perfectly informed expert is better than communication when preferences between the expert and the principal are not too far apart is reversed. We demonstrate that these organi...
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作者：Nehring, Klaus; Puppe, Clemens
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：In a general framework of abstract binary aggregation, we characterize aggregation problems in terms of the monotone Arrowian aggregators they admit. Specifically, we characterize the problems that admit non-dictatorial, locally non-dictatorial, anonymous, and neutral monotone Arrowian aggregation, respectively. As a consequence of these characterizations, we also obtain new results on the possibility of strategy-proof social choice and the concrete Arrowian aggregation of preferences into a s...
