The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dietrich, Franz; Mongin, Philippe
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.011
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 562-582
• 关键词: Doctrinal paradox; Premiss-based and conclusion-based approach; Judgment aggregation; Impossibility theorems; Majority Voting

摘要

In the framework of judgment aggregation, we assume that some formulas of the agenda are singled out as premisses, and that both Independence (formula-wise aggregation) and Unanimity Preservation hold for them. Whether premiss-based aggregation thus defined is compatible with conclusion-based aggregation, as defined by Unanimity Preservation on the non-premisses, depends on how the premisses are logically connected, both among themselves and with other formulas. We state necessary and sufficient conditions under which the combination of both approaches leads to dictatorship (resp. oligarchy), either just on the premisses or on the whole agenda. Our analysis is inspired by the doctrinal paradox of legal theory and is arguably relevant to this field as well as political science and political economy. When the set of premisses coincides with the whole agenda, a limiting case of our assumptions, we obtain several existing results in judgment aggregation theory. (C) 2010 Published by Elsevier Inc.