Communication via a strategic mediator

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ivanov, Maxim
• 署名单位: McMaster University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.08.001
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 869-884
• 关键词: communication; INFORMATION; cheap talk; Mediation

摘要

This paper investigates communication between an informed expert and an uninformed principal via a strategic mediator. We demonstrate that, for any bias in the parties' preferences, there exists a strategic mediator that provides the highest expected payoff to the principal, as if the players had communicated through an optimal non-strategic mediator. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.