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作者：Oury, Marion
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：This paper examines many-player many-action global games with multidimensional state parameters. It establishes that the notion of noise-independent selection introduced by Frankel, Morris and Pauzner [D. Frankel, S. Morris, A. Pauzner, Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities, J. Econ. Theory 108 (2003) 1-44] for one-dimensional global games is robust when the setting is extended to the one proposed by Carlsson and Van Damme [H. Carlsson, E. Van Damme, Global gam...
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作者：Basteck, Christian; Daniels, Tijmen R.; Heinemann, Frank
作者单位：Technical University of Berlin
摘要：Global games are widely used to predict behaviour in games with strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria. We establish two results on the global game selection. First, we show that, for any supermodular complete information game, the global game selection is independent of the payoff functions chosen for the game's global game embedding. Second, we give a simple sufficient criterion to derive the selection and establish noise independence in many-action games by decomposing them int...
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作者：Boucekkine, R.; Camacho, C.; Fabbri, G.
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Universite Paris Saclay
摘要：We study the optimal dynamics of an AK economy where population is uniformly distributed along the unit circle. Locations only differ in initial capital endowments. Spatio-temporal capital dynamics are described by a parabolic partial differential equation. The application of the maximum principle leads to necessary but non-sufficient first-order conditions. Thanks to the linearity of the production technology and the special spatial setting considered, the value function of the problem is fou...
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作者：Riella, Gil
作者单位：Universidade de Brasilia
摘要：Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [3] characterize preferences over menus of lotteries that can be represented by the use of a unique subjective state space and a prior. We investigate what would be the appropriate version of Dynamic Consistency in such a setup. The condition we find, which we call Flexibility Consistency, is linked to a comparative theory of preference for flexibility. When the subjective state space is finite, we show that Flexibility Consistency is equivalent to a subjective ve...
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作者：Kolotilin, Anton; Li, Hao; Li, Wei
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; University of British Columbia
摘要：This article studies a principal-agent problem where the only commitment for the uninformed principal is to restrict the set of decisions she makes following a report by the informed agent. We show that an ex ante optimal equilibrium for the principal corresponds to a finite partition of the state space, and each retained decision is ex post suboptimal for the principal, biased toward the agent's preference. Generally an optimal equilibrium does not maximize the number of decisions the princip...
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作者：van den Brink, Rene; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This mechanism takes into account that a player is only able to communicate with other players (i.e., to make proposals about a division of the surplus of cooperation) when they are connected in the graph. (C) 2...
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作者：Hu, Tai-Wei; Rocheteau, Guillaume
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of California System; University of California Irvine; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas
摘要：This paper adopts mechanism design to investigate the coexistence of fiat money and higher-return assets. We consider an economy with pairwise meetings where fiat money and risk-free capital compete as means of payment, as in [28]. The trading mechanism in pairwise meetings is chosen among all individually rational, renegotiation-proof mechanisms to maximize society's welfare. We show that in any stationary monetary equilibrium capital commands a higher rate of return than fiat money. (C) 2013...
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作者：Liu, Liqun; Meyer, Jack
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Michigan State University
摘要：This paper defines the rate of substitution of one stochastic change to a random variable for another. It then focuses on the case where one of these changes is an nth degree risk increase, and the other is an mth degree risk increase, where n > m >= 1. The paper shows that the rate of substitution for these two risk increases can be used to provide a broader definition and two additional characterizations of the nth degree Ross more risk averse partial order. The implications for local intens...
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作者：Kadan, Ohad; Swinkels, Jeroen M.
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Northwestern University
摘要：We study the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach or other common structure. We present sufficient conditions under which the shadow value of simultaneously tightening the minimum payment and individual rationality constraints has a simple and intuitive expression. We then show how this expression can be used to perform comparative statics exercises in which we study (i) the effect of a change in the agent's wealth on the well-being of the principal; and (ii) the effects of th...
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作者：Luz, Vitor Farinha
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in auction settings with 'rich' type spaces, where bidders obtain information from sources other than their own valuation. By considering a relaxed problem, we provide an upper bound on revenue extraction that explicitly builds on the richness of the information structure. We provide a condition under which this upper bound is achieved and describe an optimal mechanism. Under this condition, we also show that the optimal revenue can be achieved thr...
