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作者：Laraki, Rida; Mertikopoulos, Panayotis
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：Continuous-time game dynamics are typically first order systems where payoffs determine the growth rate of the players' strategy shares. In this paper, we investigate what happens beyond first order by viewing payoffs as higher order forces of change, specifying e.g. the acceleration of the players' evolution instead of its velocity (a viewpoint which emerges naturally when it comes to aggregating empirical data of past instances of play). To that end, we derive a wide class of higher order ga...
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作者：Miller, Alan D.
作者单位：University of Haifa; University of Haifa
摘要：I introduce a model of community standards relevant to the judicial determination of obscenity. Standards are defined as subjective judgments restricted only by a simple reasonableness condition. Individual standards are aggregated to form the community standard. Several axioms reflect legal concerns. These require that the community standard (a) preserve unanimous agreements, (b) become more permissive when all individuals become more permissive, and not discriminate, ex ante, (c) between ind...
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作者：Ollier, Sandrine; Thomas, Lionel
作者单位：Universite Marie et Louis Pasteur
摘要：This paper analyzes optimal contracting when an agent has private information before contracting and exerts bidden effort that stochastically affects the output. Additionally, the contract is constrained to satisfy the agent's ex post participation. We highlight three features of this model. First, the agent faces countervailing incentives. Second, the separation of types is never optimal. Third, the optimal constant bonus rewarding success is distorted downward below its efficient level. (C) ...
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作者：Challe, Edouard; Le Grand, Francois; Ragot, Xavier
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; emlyon business school; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：We analyse the term structure of interest rates in a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets, borrowing constraint, and positive net supply of government bonds. Uninsured idiosyncratic shocks generate bond trades, while aggregate shocks cause fluctuations in the trading price of bonds. Long bonds command a liquidation risk premium over short bonds, because they may have to be liquidated before maturity following a bad idiosyncratic shock precisely when their resale value is low due t...
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作者：Mathevet, Laurent; Steiner, Jakub
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; Northwestern University
摘要：We present a family of tractable dynamic global games and its applications. Agents privately learn about a fixed fundamental, and repeatedly adjust their investments while facing frictions. The game exhibits many externalities: payoffs may depend on the volume of investment, on its volatility, and on its concentration. The solution is driven by an invariance result: aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to a large family of frictions. We use the invariance result to exam...
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作者：Menzio, Guido; Shi, Shouyong; Sun, Hongfei
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Toronto; Queens University - Canada
摘要：We construct and analyze a tractable search model of money with a non-degenerate distribution of money holdings. Analytical tractability comes from modeling decentralized exchange as directed search, which makes the monetary steady state block recursive. By adapting lattice-theoretic techniques, we characterize individuals' policy and value functions, and show that these functions satisfy the standard conditions of optimization. We prove that a unique monetary steady state exists and provide c...
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作者：Bodoh-Creed, Aaron
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We prove that the equilibria of a large interdependent-value, uniform-price auction model where bidders have arbitrary preferences for multiple units can be approximated by a nonatomic exchange economy. We show that the uniform-price auction is approximately efficient with a large number of participants and asymptotically aggregates idiosyncratic bidder information into the market price. More generally our analysis framework provides conditions justifying the use of nonatomic limit model appro...
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作者：Barseghyan, Levon; Battaglini, Marco; Coate, Stephen
作者单位：Cornell University; Princeton University
摘要：This paper explores the implications of the political economy model of Battaglini and Coate (2008) [8] for the behavior of fiscal policy over the business cycle. The model predicts that fiscal policy is counter-cyclical with debt increasing in recessions and decreasing in booms. Public spending increases in booms and decreases during recessions, while tax rates decrease during booms and increase in recessions. In both booms and recessions, fiscal policies are set so that the marginal cost of p...
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作者：Murto, Pauli; Valimaki, Juuso
作者单位：Aalto University
摘要：We consider equilibrium timing decisions in a model with a large number of players and informational externalities. The players have private information about a common payoff parameter that determines the optimal time to invest. They learn from each other in real time by observing past investment decisions. We develop new methods of analysis for such large games, and we give a full characterization of symmetric equilibria. We show that the equilibrium statistical inferences are based on an exp...
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作者：Eraslan, Huelya; McLennan, Andrew
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Queensland
摘要：We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, the proposer's identity is randomly determined, the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one, each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal, and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer. The theory of the fixed point index is used to show that stationary equilibrium expected payoffs of this coalitional bargaining game a...
