Surplus extraction with rich type spaces

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Luz, Vitor Farinha
• 署名单位: Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.016
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2749-2762
• 关键词: Surplus extraction; Information rents; mechanism design; private information; Correlated information; Partial implementation

摘要

We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in auction settings with 'rich' type spaces, where bidders obtain information from sources other than their own valuation. By considering a relaxed problem, we provide an upper bound on revenue extraction that explicitly builds on the richness of the information structure. We provide a condition under which this upper bound is achieved and describe an optimal mechanism. Under this condition, we also show that the optimal revenue can be achieved through dominant strategy implementation. The optimal revenue result generalizes the full surplus extraction result of Cremer and McLean (1988) [5] as well as the standard independent private values revenue maximizing auction presented in Myerson (1981) [10], providing a unified treatment for two sets of results irreconcilable so far. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.