On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kadan, Ohad; Swinkels, Jeroen M.
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.08.001
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2313-2343
• 关键词: Principal-agent; moral hazard; first-order approach

摘要

We study the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach or other common structure. We present sufficient conditions under which the shadow value of simultaneously tightening the minimum payment and individual rationality constraints has a simple and intuitive expression. We then show how this expression can be used to perform comparative statics exercises in which we study (i) the effect of a change in the agent's wealth on the well-being of the principal; and (ii) the effects of the outside option and minimum payment on the effort level optimally implemented. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.