Community standards

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miller, Alan D.
• 署名单位: University of Haifa; University of Haifa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.008
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2696-2705
• 关键词: Community standards; axioms; Obscenity; aggregation; Doctrinal paradox

摘要

I introduce a model of community standards relevant to the judicial determination of obscenity. Standards are defined as subjective judgments restricted only by a simple reasonableness condition. Individual standards are aggregated to form the community standard. Several axioms reflect legal concerns. These require that the community standard (a) preserve unanimous agreements, (b) become more permissive when all individuals become more permissive, and not discriminate, ex ante, (c) between individuals and (d) between works. I show that any rule which satisfies these properties must be similar to unanimity rule. I also explore the relationship between the model and the doctrinal paradox of Kornhauser and Sager [12]. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.