Ex post participation constraint in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ollier, Sandrine; Thomas, Lionel
• 署名单位: Universite Marie et Louis Pasteur
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.007
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2383-2403
• 关键词: Ex post participation; adverse selection; moral hazard; Countervailing incentives; Pooling contracts

摘要

This paper analyzes optimal contracting when an agent has private information before contracting and exerts bidden effort that stochastically affects the output. Additionally, the contract is constrained to satisfy the agent's ex post participation. We highlight three features of this model. First, the agent faces countervailing incentives. Second, the separation of types is never optimal. Third, the optimal constant bonus rewarding success is distorted downward below its efficient level. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.