Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bodoh-Creed, Aaron
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.012
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2436-2466
• 关键词: Auctions; information aggregation; large markets

摘要

We prove that the equilibria of a large interdependent-value, uniform-price auction model where bidders have arbitrary preferences for multiple units can be approximated by a nonatomic exchange economy. We show that the uniform-price auction is approximately efficient with a large number of participants and asymptotically aggregates idiosyncratic bidder information into the market price. More generally our analysis framework provides conditions justifying the use of nonatomic limit model approximations to analyze the large-market behavior of game-theoretic models. We demonstrate continuity requirements on the economic primitives sufficient for the equilibrium strategies of the two models to converge as the number of participants in the finite game approaches infinity. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.