Information quality and crises in regime-change games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Iachan, Felipe S.; Nenov, Plamen T.
• 署名单位: BI Norwegian Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.005
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 739-768
• 关键词: Global games; Public and private information; Rollover

摘要

When crises potentially originate from coordination failures, does a deterioration in the quality of the information available to market participants contribute towards instability? We address this question in a general global game of regime change with a unique equilibrium and illustrate the implications in a debt rollover application. We show that a reduction in the quality of information increases the likelihood of regime change, thus reducing stability, when the net payoff in the case of a successful attack is more sensitive to the fundamentals than the net payoff in the case of status quo survival. We also discuss welfare implications. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.