Matching markets under (in)complete information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ehlers, Lars; Masso, Jordi
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.008
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 295-314
• 关键词: Many-to-one matching market; STABILITY; incomplete information

摘要

We introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). We show that given a common prior, a strategy profile is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium under incomplete information in a stable mechanism if and only if, for any true profile in the support of the common prior, the submitted profile is a Nash equilibrium under complete information in the direct preference revelation game induced by the stable mechanism. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.