Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chan, Jimmy; Zhang, Wenzhang
• 署名单位: Fudan University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.004
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 188-211
• 关键词: Collusion; oligopoly; Repeated game; private information; private monitoring

摘要

This paper shows that a cartel that observes neither costs, prices, nor sales may still enforce a collusive agreement by tying each firm's continuation profit to the truncated current profits of the other firms. The mechanism applies to both price and quantity competition, and the main features are broadly consistent with common cartel practice identified by Harrington and Skrzypacz [24]. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.