Communication with endogenous information acquisition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Di Pei, Harry
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.011
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 132-149
• 关键词: Cheap talk; information acquisition; COMMUNICATION

摘要

I develop a theory of communication in which a sender gathers costly information before giving advice to a receiver. In a general setting, I show that the sender always communicates all her information to the receiver in every equilibrium. In the uniform-quadratic model in which the sender can choose any finite partition as her information structure, an upwardly biased sender can convey more precise information when recommending a larger action. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.