Equilibria and incentives in private information economies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sun, Xiang; Sun, Yeneng; Wu, Lei; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
• 署名单位: Wuhan University; National University of Singapore; University of Iowa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.010
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 474-488
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; incentive compatibility; Insurance equilibrium; Private core; Private information economy; Walrasian expectations equilibrium

摘要

This paper considers three solution concepts in a large private information economy, namely, Walrasian expectations equilibrium, private core, and insurance equilibrium. It shows that these three concepts coincide with each other when the agents are informationally negligible in such an economy. In contrast to the finite-agent setting, one can construct a large private information economy in which incentive compatibility fails completely in the sense that almost every agent in any Walrasian expectations equilibrium/private core/insurance equilibrium allocation has the incentive to misreport her type. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.